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The decision of the California Supreme Court in 
August of 1971 in the case of Serranov. Priest has 
unleashed an unprecedented fury of activity in the 
area of education finance reform. Advocates of reform 
in the systems by which states and localities finance 
public education had in 1969 been given what seemed 
to be an important setback when the United States 
Supreme Court refused to use the standard of 
"educational need" to declare invalid the Illinois 
system of financing public education. The result in 
that case, whose plaintiffs had based their claim for 
relief on the federal equal protection clause, required 
that a new approach be adopted in the effort to 
restructure education finance systems. 
That new approach had been begun in California 
in mid-1968, and with the aid of the negative guidance 
provided by the Supreme Court's rejection of the 
"educational need" standard, the attorneys in the 
case were able to refine their approach to meet the 
judicial desire for manageable standards. The decision 
in Serrano v. Priest was the result of that effort. In the 
months since Serrano was decided, two other decisions 
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have reaffirmed this approach to the education 
finance problem-Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, decided 
by a Minnesota District Court in mid-October, 1971, 
and Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School 
District, decided by a three-judge District Court panel 
in Texas on December 23. Dozens of similar lawsuits 
are pending in other jurisdictions around the country, 
and the number of such suits is still growing. 
Of primary importance, the Rodriguez decision is 
most probably appealable directly to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, because it was decided by a three-judge 
Federal District Court and because the Court granted 
an injunction. (On January 8, 1972 the Texas State 
Board of Education voted unanimously to appeal the 
case directly to the High Court.) It is therefore likely 
that within the next twelve to eighteen months the 
Supreme Court will clarify its position on this latest 
approach to untangling the problems of financing the 
nation's public schools. 
Whatever the final decision of the Court, however, 
the Serrano principle may have significant impact on 
areas of American life ranging beyond educational 
quality and intra-state taxpayer equity. The Nixon 
administration is reportedly planning to introduce a 
"value-added" tax to help lessen the reliance of states 
and localities on the property tax in financing edu-
cation. This tax, in effect a type of national sales tax, 
if enacted may mean that a major effect of Serrano 
might be to increase, rather than decrease, regressivity 
in the overall national tax structure. 1 The basic 
concept of the tax seems to indicate that only a very 
high degree of rebating or tax crediting at the lower 
end of the income spectrum would enable such a 
value-added tax to be anything other than highly re-
gressive in its effect. In the area of national taxation, 
therefore, the ultimate impact of the Serrano principle 
may be one nqt fully anticipated by those who have 
championed its development. 
Another long-range implication of Serrano may 
prove to be more important than the sum total of its 
effects on educational quality and taxpayer equity. 
It is at least arguable that if the Serrano principle is 
adopted, much of the "respectable" argument against 
the erection of low- and moderate-income housing in 
suburban communities will be robbed of whatever 
IPaitiml'l<"'V it <"'llrTPntlv "'°''"'"'"""'" Nn lnn<rf'T will 
suburban communities be able to resist such housing 
on the grounds that it would bankrupt the municipality 
because the cost of educating the children who would 
live in such housing would far exceed the property 
tax income derived from that housing. Other ob-
jections would still remain-the most obvious of such 
objections being racial prejudice. Both legally and 
psychologically, however, it will prove much more 
difficult for suburbanites to maintain such objections 
without the support of the economic argument which 
now lends a certain social acceptability to attempts 
to exclude poor people from the suburbs. 
National tax policy and the future of low- and 
moderate-income housing in the suburbs are but two 
of a myriad of far-ranging implications which will 
inevitably develop if the Serrano principle gains more 
widespread adoption in the various states. The 
articles in this special section on Serrano consider 
both the legal theory of the case and the possible 
practical outcomes on the state and local level of 
adoption by the courts of that legal theory. 
The editors believe these articles represent the first 
published in-depth discussion since the decision in 
Serrano of many of the issues raised by the Court in 
that case. We invite comment from our readers on the 
broad question of reform of American education 
finance, as the nation begins to debate important 
issues which for too long have been left undiscussed. 
1. See The New York Times, January 9, 1972, section 12, 
p. 13. Of course, the specific features of any such value-added 
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